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Awareness Lessons
4 weeks ago

AitM Phishing Campaign Bypasses MFA to Steal Google Credentials from Taiwan Researchers

Written by AI from the linked story. Not reviewed by an editor. How this works

The UAT-11985 campaign demonstrates how sophisticated threat actors use socially engineered spear-phishing lures — in this case, fake event invitations — to trick targeted individuals into surrendering credentials and MFA codes via an adversary-in-the-middle (AitM) framework. AitM attacks are particularly dangerous because they defeat traditional MFA by proxying the authentication session in real time, rendering SMS and TOTP-based MFA ineffective. Research institutions are high-value targets for nation-state actors due to their access to sensitive intellectual property and government-adjacent data. This attack underscores that even security-conscious users can be deceived by contextually relevant lures, and that MFA alone is not a silver bullet against advanced phishing techniques.

Tactical Insight

Immediate actions

  • Train staff to verify event invitations through official channels before clicking any embedded links.
  • Migrate Google Workspace accounts to phishing-resistant MFA such as FIDO2/passkeys or hardware security keys, which cannot be intercepted by AitM frameworks.

Long-term improvements

  • Implement a Zero Trust architecture requiring continuous verification of user identity and device posture before granting access to sensitive resources.
  • Establish strict email filtering rules and link-rewriting policies that flag or sandbox unexpected external invitations and redirect URLs.
  • Conduct regular spear-phishing simulations tailored to the organization's threat profile, including lures mimicking legitimate professional events.

Detection measures

  • Enable Google Workspace's Advanced Protection Program for high-risk users such as researchers and executives to add additional authentication safeguards.
  • Monitor authentication logs for anomalous sign-in locations, rapid token reuse, or session hijacking indicators that may signal an AitM compromise.
  • Deploy a SIEM or UEBA solution to alert on impossible travel or concurrent session anomalies tied to user accounts.

Back this up with a control

All controls and vendors

Training helps people spot this. These controls make the attack fail even on the day someone does not.