OAuth Client ID Spoofing Lets Attackers Validate Stolen Microsoft Entra Credentials
OAuth client ID spoofing lets attackers validate stolen Microsoft Entra credentials without detection.
Two distinct threat actor groups are exploiting a novel OAuth client ID spoofing technique to enumerate user accounts and validate stolen credentials in Microsoft Entra ID environments while evading sign-in telemetry. By providing spoofed OAuth client IDs in authentication requests, attackers can infer valid usernames and passwords at scale without generating successful sign-in events that would alert defenders. The campaigns UNK_pyreq2323 and UNK_OutFlareAZ have targeted thousands of tenants, affecting millions of users since late 2025.
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The lesson from this incident
Full lessonAttackers are exploiting a flaw in how Microsoft Entra ID processes OAuth client IDs, allowing them to submit spoofed identifiers during authentication requests to enumerate valid accounts and verify stolen credentials at scale. The critical danger is that these requests do not generate standard successful sign-in events, meaning most existing detection rules and alerting thresholds are completely blind to this activity. This highlights a systemic over-reliance on sign-in success/failure logs as the primary signal for credential-based attacks. Defenders who assume that no alerts means no attack are left exposed when adversaries deliberately craft requests that fall outside normal telemetry pipelines. The scale of impact—millions of users across thousands of tenants—demonstrates how a single telemetry blind spot can be weaponized into a mass-exploitation campaign.
What helps against this
How we list vendors- Phishing-resistant MFA
A stolen password, or a user who taps Approve on a push prompt, is no longer enough to log in.
- Identity threat detection and response (ITDR)
Attackers who log in with real, stolen credentials get noticed.
- Security monitoring (SIEM)
Logs from everywhere end up in one place, with alerts that someone actually sees.
Indicators of Compromise
Extracted by AI from the linked source. Not reviewed by an editor. How this works
- malware — UNK_CustomCloak
- malware — UNK_pyreq2323
- malware — UNK_OutFlareAZ
- mitre_attack — T1110.003
- mitre_attack — T1087