Antino Backdoor Uses Outlook and OneDrive for C2 in China-Nexus Espionage Campaign
China-nexus actor deploys new Antino backdoor targeting Asian government and policy organizations.
A China-nexus threat actor, tracked as UAT-11587 by Cisco Talos, is conducting an espionage campaign against government and policy organizations across Asia using a new backdoor named Antino. The malware, compiled in Rust, leverages Microsoft 365 services like Outlook and OneDrive for command and control. The campaign, which began in September 2025, has expanded to target entities in eight Asian countries and shows potential links to other China-aligned threat groups.
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The lesson from this incident
Full lessonThe Antino backdoor, attributed to the China-nexus group UAT-11587, exploits legitimate Microsoft 365 services — Outlook and OneDrive — as command-and-control channels, allowing malicious traffic to blend seamlessly with trusted business communications. This technique is particularly dangerous because most organizations whitelist Microsoft services at the network perimeter, effectively neutralizing traditional C2 detection methods. The campaign targeting government and policy organizations highlights how nation-state actors increasingly 'live off the land' using trusted cloud infrastructure to evade detection. Without granular monitoring of API-level behavior and anomalous cloud service usage patterns, defenders have limited visibility into this class of threat. The use of Rust-compiled malware also increases resilience against reverse engineering and behavioral detection.
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Indicators of Compromise
Extracted by AI from the linked source. Not reviewed by an editor. How this works
- domain — rsproxy[.]cn
- domain — d32tpl7xt7175h.cloudfront[.]net