[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"$fB-ml3PEwbb6-h-7Nrr3ecC_iBcdFsnuVAF5s8aE-x3w":3},{"lesson":4},{"id":5,"slug":6,"article_id":7,"title":8,"body":9,"prevention":10,"framework_refs":11,"framework_notes":19,"status":27,"created_at":28,"published_at":29,"article":30,"tags":34,"podcasts":47,"controls":48},"f99e876e-a86a-44f4-bfcb-2427b9b168dd","default-credentials-and-waf-bypasses-let-researchers-remotely-hijack-connected-cars","439902e2-0447-4656-a1ec-544db2598d60","Default Credentials and WAF Bypasses Let Researchers Remotely Hijack Connected Cars","Researchers exploited weaknesses in the ForgeRock identity platform used by major automakers, including WAF bypasses and default credentials left in production environments, to gain unauthorized remote control over vehicle functions such as door locks and engine starts. The root failure was twofold: identity infrastructure was misconfigured with default credentials never rotated, and perimeter defenses (WAF) were bypassable, meaning no meaningful barrier stood between attackers and sensitive vehicle control APIs. This matters enormously because connected vehicle APIs bridge the digital and physical worlds — a compromised app is not just a data breach, it is a potential physical safety incident. Organizations deploying third-party identity platforms must treat their configuration hardening and credential hygiene with the same rigor as their own code.","**Immediate actions:**\n- Rotate all default credentials on the ForgeRock (or any identity platform) deployment immediately and enforce a credential inventory audit.\n- Test WAF rule sets against known bypass techniques and validate that authentication endpoints cannot be reached via alternative paths or encoded requests.\n\n**Long-term improvements:**\n- Adopt a secure-by-default configuration baseline for all identity and API gateway components, reviewed at every version upgrade.\n- Implement API-level authorization checks that do not rely solely on perimeter controls, ensuring vehicle command APIs require strong, scoped tokens regardless of how the request arrives.\n- Conduct regular third-party penetration testing specifically targeting connected vehicle APIs and the identity layer supporting them.\n\n**Detection measures:**\n- Deploy behavioral anomaly detection on vehicle command APIs to alert on unusual patterns such as bulk unlock commands or geographically improbable access.\n- Centralize and monitor identity platform logs for failed authentication attempts, WAF rule triggers, and out-of-hours administrative access.",[12,13,14,15,16,17,18],"NIST CSF 2.0 PR.AA: Identity Management, Authentication, and Access Control","CIS Control 7: Continuous Vulnerability Management","ISO\u002FIEC 27001:2022 A.8.8: Management of technical vulnerabilities","NIST SP 800-53 SI-2: Flaw Remediation","OWASP A06:2021 Vulnerable and Outdated Components","CIS Control 17: Incident Response Management","NIS2 Article 21(2)(b)",{"NIS2 Article 21(2)(b)":20,"NIST SP 800-53 SI-2: Flaw Remediation":21,"CIS Control 17: Incident Response Management":22,"OWASP A06:2021 Vulnerable and Outdated Components":23,"CIS Control 7: Continuous Vulnerability Management":24,"ISO\u002FIEC 27001:2022 A.8.8: Management of technical vulnerabilities":25,"NIST CSF 2.0 PR.AA: Identity Management, Authentication, and Access Control":26},"NIS2 requires incident handling and security measures for networked systems; automakers operating connected vehicle infrastructure are obligated under this article to ensure access control and configuration management practices prevent exactly this type of unauthorized remote command execution.","The WAF bypass and default credential issues represent known flaw classes; a formal flaw remediation process would have required these to be identified and corrected before the system was exposed to production traffic.","The ability to remotely unlock and start vehicles constitutes a physical safety incident class; a tested incident response plan specific to connected vehicle API compromise would reduce response time and limit harm when such exploits are discovered.","The automakers relied on a third-party identity platform (ForgeRock) without sufficiently hardening or validating its configuration, mirroring the OWASP risk of using components without reviewing their security posture.","Regular vulnerability scanning of the ForgeRock deployment and associated WAF configurations would have identified the exploitable weaknesses before researchers — or malicious actors — did.","This control requires organizations to identify, assess, and remediate technical vulnerabilities in a timely manner; applying it to the ForgeRock platform would have prompted hardening of default settings and WAF rules.","Default credentials left active on the ForgeRock identity platform directly violated the requirement to manage identities and enforce strong authentication for access to sensitive resources, including vehicle control APIs.","published","2026-11-09T18:21:26.862598+00:00","2026-11-09T18:21:26.782+00:00",{"id":7,"url":31,"slug":32,"title":33},"https:\u002F\u002Fwww.theregister.com\u002Fsecurity\u002F2026\u002F11\u002F09\u002Fresearchers-pwn-automakers-android-apps-to-remotely-unlock-cars-honk-horns\u002F5308483","researchers-pwn-automakers-android-apps-to-remotely-unlock-cars-honk-horns-455923","Researchers pwn automakers’ Android apps to remotely unlock cars, honk horns",[35,41],{"id":36,"name":37,"slug":38,"description":39,"color":40},"1ec88fde-2d0f-4ed8-932a-33f5ccc0fdc7","Access Control","access-control","Excessive privileges, missing MFA, weak auth","#f97316",{"id":42,"name":43,"slug":44,"description":45,"color":46},"859cf0ad-a7e9-42bb-a75d-bac6511fa5d5","Configuration Management","configuration-management","Misconfigs, default credentials, exposed services","#eab308",[],[49,53,57],{"slug":50,"name":51,"problem":52},"identity-threat-detection","Identity threat detection and response (ITDR)","Attackers who log in with real, stolen credentials get noticed.",{"slug":54,"name":55,"problem":56},"secrets-management","Secrets management","API keys, tokens and passwords stop leaking from code, chat and configuration files.",{"slug":58,"name":59,"problem":60},"waf-ddos","Web application firewall and DDoS protection","Websites and APIs stay up, and common web attacks are filtered before they reach them."]