[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"$f8r7glOGMxgY5Fg9Nkao0gE_BPP7JxhOkMQ3hCk1KM_s":3},{"article":4,"iocs":41,"watch_terms":42,"solutions":43,"lesson":129},{"id":5,"title":6,"slug":7,"summary":8,"ai_summary":9,"brief":10,"url":11,"image_url":12,"published_at":13,"ingested_at":14,"relevance_score":15,"entities":16,"category_id":20,"category":21,"article_tags":25},"433df8ec-42b7-4d4d-8fa1-10eb51e7474d","When an AI Agent Goes Wrong, Can You Stop It?","when-an-ai-agent-goes-wrong-can-you-stop-it-ed1f4b","Suppose an AI agent is asked to sort support tickets and look up account details. A ticket contains instructions that lead the agent to export records to an unfamiliar destination. The agent can make the request because its identity has access to the records and its connected tools allow the action. That kind of scenario raises a response question: what does “stop the agent” actually mean? A","The article examines how AI agents operating within larger systems can perform unintended actions—such as exporting data to unauthorized destinations—even when technically permitted by their assigned identity and connected tools. A team cannot simply disable the model; effective containment requires a coordinated approach: pausing workflows, revoking credentials and sessions, disabling tool access, and restricting network paths. The OWASP GenAI Security Project recommends testing whether agents can be fully contained before deployment and identifying suspicious signals such as resource access outside assigned tasks, unusual volume of operations, or activity that doesn't match normal patterns.","OWASP GenAI Security Project warns AI agents can exceed intended scope; proper containment requires pausing workflows,","https:\u002F\u002Fthehackernews.com\u002F2026\u002F11\u002Fwhen-ai-agent-goes-wrong-can-you-stop-it.html","https:\u002F\u002Fblogger.googleusercontent.com\u002Fimg\u002Fb\u002FR29vZ2xl\u002FAVvXsEhXkpxeEuWVGmGvK8wGnGdzjVbMHRyNOYd3GFjgzJZZN7TL2yyLt5Jof4gsujMYS9WfZnxUjFFs3mxFaejShy46vuXK38l_5R3RvospJ6J8IunrLPSDnI0sJgGtvNiNkc89XMR_KDDHWEOxAk800C2fKhwiOLMy433M3ASErPk_jMwoexS_5-1kpdJ8emE\u002Fs1600\u002FKeeper.jpg","2026-11-13T11:52:31+00:00","2026-11-13T12:00:35.451281+00:00",7,[17],{"name":18,"type":19},"AI agents","technology","839da5c1-3c34-47e2-9499-f7201640e3ac",{"id":20,"icon":22,"name":23,"slug":24},null,"AI Security","ai-security",[26,31,36],{"category":27},{"id":28,"icon":22,"name":29,"slug":30},"02371804-cf6d-4449-98de-f1a2d4d9b266","Tools","tools",{"category":32},{"id":33,"icon":22,"name":34,"slug":35},"2c8f44d4-b56e-47cf-9677-04f22c9ee78d","Identity & Access","identity-access",{"category":37},{"id":38,"icon":22,"name":39,"slug":40},"c5eccf7c-abbc-4bd3-bbed-e6da5cba8e73","Incident Response","incident-response",[],[],{"controls":44,"vendors":128},[45,74,103],{"slug":46,"name":47,"problem":48,"products":49},"identity-threat-detection","Identity threat detection and response (ITDR)","Attackers who log in with real, stolen credentials get noticed.",[50,58,66],{"vendor_slug":51,"vendor_name":52,"vendor_logo":53,"product_slug":54,"product_name":55,"url":56,"description":57},"vectra-ai","Vectra AI","\u002Fvendor-logos\u002Fvectra-ai.png","vectra-ai-platform","Vectra AI Platform","https:\u002F\u002Fwww.vectra.ai\u002Fplatform","Detection of attacker behaviour across network, identity and cloud.",{"vendor_slug":59,"vendor_name":60,"vendor_logo":61,"product_slug":62,"product_name":63,"url":64,"description":65},"huntress","Huntress","\u002Fvendor-logos\u002Fhuntress.png","managed-itdr","Huntress Managed ITDR","https:\u002F\u002Fwww.huntress.com\u002Fplatform\u002Fmanaged-itdr","Managed detection of suspicious activity in Microsoft 365 and Entra ID.",{"vendor_slug":67,"vendor_name":68,"vendor_logo":69,"product_slug":70,"product_name":71,"url":72,"description":73},"acalvio","Acalvio","\u002Fvendor-logos\u002Facalvio.png","shadowplex-identity-protection","ShadowPlex Identity Protection","https:\u002F\u002Fwww.acalvio.com\u002Fproducts\u002Fidentity-protection\u002F","Decoy accounts and credentials that expose identity attacks and credential misuse early.",{"slug":75,"name":76,"problem":77,"products":78},"network-segmentation","Network segmentation and microsegmentation","One compromised machine can no longer reach everything else.",[79,87,95],{"vendor_slug":80,"vendor_name":81,"vendor_logo":82,"product_slug":83,"product_name":84,"url":85,"description":86},"illumio","Illumio","\u002Fvendor-logos\u002Fillumio.png","illumio-segmentation","Illumio Segmentation","https:\u002F\u002Fwww.illumio.com\u002Fillumio-segmentation","Maps traffic between workloads and enforces segmentation across data centre, cloud and endpoints.",{"vendor_slug":88,"vendor_name":89,"vendor_logo":90,"product_slug":91,"product_name":92,"url":93,"description":94},"akamai","Akamai","\u002Fvendor-logos\u002Fakamai.png","guardicore-segmentation","Akamai Guardicore Segmentation","https:\u002F\u002Fwww.akamai.com\u002Fproducts\u002Fakamai-guardicore-segmentation","Software-based microsegmentation with traffic visibility.",{"vendor_slug":96,"vendor_name":97,"vendor_logo":98,"product_slug":99,"product_name":100,"url":101,"description":102},"threatlocker","ThreatLocker","\u002Fvendor-logos\u002Fthreatlocker.png","zero-trust-endpoint-firewall","Zero Trust Endpoint Firewall","https:\u002F\u002Fwww.threatlocker.com\u002Fcapabilities\u002Fzero-trust-endpoint-firewall","Centrally managed host firewall with device-level and dynamic access rules, to limit which machines can talk to each other.",{"slug":24,"name":104,"problem":105,"products":106},"AI application security","Prompt injection, data leaks through AI tools and unapproved AI use get caught.",[107,115,123],{"vendor_slug":108,"vendor_name":109,"vendor_logo":110,"product_slug":111,"product_name":112,"url":113,"description":114},"palo-alto-networks","Palo Alto Networks","\u002Fvendor-logos\u002Fpalo-alto-networks.png","prisma-airs","Prisma AIRS","https:\u002F\u002Fwww.paloaltonetworks.com\u002Fai-security\u002Fprisma-airs","Security for AI applications, models and agents, including runtime protection against prompt injection.",{"vendor_slug":116,"vendor_name":117,"vendor_logo":118,"product_slug":119,"product_name":120,"url":121,"description":122},"boomi","Boomi","\u002Fvendor-logos\u002Fboomi.png","boomi-agentstudio","Boomi Agentstudio","https:\u002F\u002Fboomi.com\u002Fplatform\u002Fagentstudio\u002F","Agent builder whose Agent Control Tower registers and monitors Boomi agents and agents on Amazon Bedrock, Microsoft Copilot and other platforms, keeps audit logs and can switch agents off where the provider allows it.",{"vendor_slug":116,"vendor_name":117,"vendor_logo":118,"product_slug":124,"product_name":125,"url":126,"description":127},"boomi-ai-gateway","Boomi AI Gateway","https:\u002F\u002Fboomi.com\u002Fplatform\u002Fai-gateway\u002F","Gateway for AI model and MCP tool traffic, built on Lunar.dev technology. It limits which tools each agent can call. Its enterprise version adds an approval step for new MCP servers and logs each call with the user or agent behind it.",[],{"slug":130,"title":131,"body":132,"framework_refs":133,"framework_notes":139},"ai-agent-containment-requires-more-than-pulling-the-plug","AI Agent Containment Requires More Than Pulling the Plug","AI agents operating with legitimate credentials and tool access can perform harmful or unintended actions—such as exfiltrating data—while remaining technically 'authorized' within their assigned identity. Simply stopping the underlying model is insufficient; containment requires simultaneously revoking credentials, disabling tool integrations, pausing workflows, and blocking network paths. The core failure is that organizations deploy AI agents without pre-testing whether those agents can be reliably stopped once something goes wrong. This matters because an agent acting under valid permissions can cause significant damage before human responders even recognize a problem. Without anomaly detection and a rehearsed containment playbook, the window of harm expands dramatically.",[134,135,136,137,138],"NIST SP 800-53 IR-4: Incident Handling","NIST SP 800-53 AC-6: Least Privilege","NIST CSF 2.0 DE.CM-01: Continuous Monitoring","NIST SP 800-53 AU-6: Audit Record Review, Analysis, and Reporting","NIS2 Article 21(2)(b)",{"NIS2 Article 21(2)(b)":140,"NIST SP 800-53 AC-6: Least Privilege":141,"NIST SP 800-53 IR-4: Incident Handling":142,"NIST CSF 2.0 DE.CM-01: Continuous Monitoring":143,"NIST SP 800-53 AU-6: Audit Record Review, Analysis, and Reporting":144},"NIS2 Article 21(2)(b) requires organizations to have incident handling capabilities in place, directly addressing the gap identified here: no tested, coordinated procedure existed to contain an AI agent performing unintended actions.","AC-6 requires that agents and processes are granted only the minimum permissions necessary, which would have limited the scope of unintended actions an AI agent could take even when acting within its assigned identity.","IR-4 requires organizations to implement incident handling capability that includes containment and eradication steps, which is exactly what was lacking—teams had no coordinated procedure to stop a rogue AI agent once it began operating.","DE.CM-01 calls for continuously monitoring information systems to detect anomalous activity, which would have surfaced the signals OWASP highlights—unusual operation volumes or resource access outside the agent's normal task scope.","AU-6 requires reviewing and analyzing audit records for indications of inappropriate activity, enabling detection of an AI agent exporting data to unauthorized destinations before significant harm occurs."]